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The "Market Necessity" Defense in Antitrust: A
New Limit on the Area For Application of
Per Se Rules?
CLEMENT B. WOOD*
Per se rules are a familiar part of the antitrust landscape today. They
embrace various types of "vertical" arrangements among firms on dif-
ferent levels of the distribution chain as well as a number of practices
engaged in by a single firm with market power. But probably the most
disfavored arrangements of all-and the ones of concern here--are certain
types of "horizontal" arrangements among competitors on the same level
of distribution. Thus combinations or agreements by competing firms to
fix prices, divide markets, or engage in group boycotts are all per se il-
legal. These various practices were placed within a per se illegal category
only after considerable judicial experience with them had indicated that
they rarely served "any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition,"' so that there was little to be gained from exhaustive and
time-consuming examination of possible justifications every time such a
practice was challenged in court. Per se rules, evolving out of considera-
tions of judicial economy, also ease the burden on the plaintiff, who need
only prove that the challenged arrangement falls within a per se
category. It then becomes the duty of the court to hold the arrangement
illegal, without regard to possible justifications.
The simplicity which per se rules appear to bring to antitrust law is
largely illusory, however, since there is considerable confusion among the
courts as to what conduct falls within and what conduct falls without the
scope of the various per se rules. Needless to say, the per se label should
be applied only after a careful analysis of whether the challenged arrange-
ment falls within the per se prohibited class. If there is any doubt, it is
wiser to err on the side of non-inclusion, as arrangements falling outside
of a per se category are still subject to scrutiny under the rule of reason.2
*J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 1978; law clerk to Judge Latham Castle,
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1978-79.
'Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-306 (1949). Referring
to this passage, the court stated in a footnote in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958): "[SJuch nonanticompetitive purposes as these arrangements have been
asserted to possess can be adequately accomplished by other means much less inimical to
competition." Id. at 6 n.5 (citations omitted).
For a statement of the view that per se rules develop only after considerable judicial ex-
perience with an arrangement, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
607-608 (1972).
2As stated by one commentator,
It should be plain why there is a real danger of the abuse of the per se princi-
ple by those predisposed to offer mechanical or dogmatic solutions to legal
problems. In every antitrust case there are two routes to a finding of illegali-
ty: critically analyzing the competitive effects and possible justifications of
the challenged practice; or subsuming it under one of the per se rules. The lat-
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A number of courts have avoided applying a per se analysis in
borderline cases by narrowing the scope of the per se category so as not
to include the challenged conduct' or by deferring per se treatment pen-
ding further judicial experience with a novel type of alleged restraint.4 In
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (CBS v. ASCAP),5 however, the Second Circuit
broke new ground by proposing that a practice which fell within a per se
category might nevertheless be justifiable if "absolutely necessary for
the market to function at all."'6 As the per se inquiry, by definition, is
complete once a determination of inclusion within the per se category is
made, this new exception, never before explicitly recognized by a court,
strikes at the very core of the per se concept.
One way the per se rule could survive after ASCAP is if the market
necessity exception were extremely narrow, so that the "Per Se Rule with
a Market-Functioning Exception ' 7 were qualitatively different from a
straight rule of reason analysis. It is clear that the court itself thought it
was creating a very narrow exception which would not engulf the per se
rule,8 but it will be shown that the court's "market necessity" analysis is
no different from, and perhaps even more lenient than, a traditional rule
of reason inquiry. Since, then, the per se rule cannot be saved by the nar-
rowness of the new exception, this comment will propose a method of sav-
ing it by carving out a definable area for application of the "market
necessity" exception, leaving other areas for application of a straight per
se rule without the exception. The "market necessity" exception to the
per se rule can be confined to situations where the challenged arrange-
ment is ancillary to, and in furtherance of, a combination of competitors
ter route is naturally the more tempting; it is easier to classify a practice in a
forbidden category than to demonstrate from the ground up, as it were, why
it is against public policy and should be forbidden.
Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 Coi,. L. REv. 625, 627 (1966)
quoted in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,-390 U.S. 145, 170 n. 3 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3Most courts have thought that the only way of avoiding a per se rule is to somehow
distinguish the challenged conduct from the type of conduct previously found to fall within
a per se category. The district court's opinion in CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), is an example of this traditional approach. Id. at 748.
'E.g., Worthen Bank & Trust v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 126 (8th
Cir. 1973).
5562 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted 47 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct. 3, 1978) (No. 77-1578).
Id. at 136. The market necessity exception to the per se rule was first proposed by the
government in an amicus brief on the petition for certiorari of K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin
Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968). K-91 also in-
volved an attack on ASCAP's blanket license, but the attack was by a radio station. See
note 25 infra.
The "market necessity" exception was discussed by the district court in an earlier ruling
on a motion for summary judgment brought by ASCAP on the basis of the K-91 case. CBS
v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In its appellate brief, CBS argued that the "market necessity" exception's validity had
been premised on the state of computer technology in 1967, and that in light of recent
developments in computer technology it no longer applied. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at
27-29, CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977).
'562 F.2d at 136.
'Id. at 137, 138 n. 22; and see text accompanying notes 26-27 infra.
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which is able to produce a product, provide a service, or serve a function
which no single firm could do.
CBS v. ASCAP: The Treatment of the Issues
by the District Court and the Court of Appeals
At issue in CBS v. ASCAP was the legality of the "blanket licensing"
by ASCAP and BMI 9 of performance rights in copyrighted musical com-
positions to the CBS television network. Under the terms of the chal-
lenged blanket license, users are entitled to perform any and all composi-
tions in the repertories of ASCAP and BMI on an unlimited basis for a
negotiated annual fee.' 0
At trial, CBS challenged the blanket license as an illegal tie-in because
it forced the user to acquire rights to music it did not need in order to ob-
tain the rights to the music it did need." The trial court dismissed this
claim on the basis of its major finding of fact--that CBS would be able to
obtain performance rights through direct negotiation with copyright
holders.12 The availability and feasibility of such a direct licensing
market signified that CBS was not compelled to purchase the blanket
license, and in the absence of a finding of compulsion the tie-in claim
failed as a matter of law.
CBS argued at trial the price fixing claim of concern here, but only at a
late stage in the proceedings. The district court dismissed this claim on
the grounds that all the precedents supporting a per se price fixing rule
involved some arrangement respecting the price at which each seller
would offer his own products, whereas the CBS case involved the setting
of a price on the entire repertory, leaving each copyright holder free to set
gThese are the two major performing rights organizations. The American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) has a repertory of over three million com-
positions, while Broadcast Music, Incorporated (BMI) has a repertory of over one million
compositions. Their combined repertories include virtually every domestic copyrighted
composition. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). There is a third licens-
ing organization called SESAC, which is much smaller and privately owned by the
Heinecke family. Its repertory includes a large amount of gospel music. S. SHEMEI.& M.W.
KRASIIOVSKY. THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 136-38 (1977). In 1975, ASCAP collected over $85
million in performance fees from broadcasters and other sources; BMI collected about
$52.5 million; and SESAC collected only about $2.5 million. Id. at 162. ASCAP has been
operating under the terms of a consent decree stemming from a 1941 antitrust suit
brought by the government. BMI has likewise been operating under a consent decree since
1966, while SESAC's operations are not governed by a consent decree. ASCAP and BMI
are both required under the terms of their respective consent decrees to offer "per pro-
gram" licenses to broadcasters in addition to the blanket licenses they have traditionally
offered. The consent decrees are discussed in the district court opinion. 400 F. Supp. at
743-45.
"In 1969 the ASCAP blanket license cost CBS $5.7 million and the BMI license cost $1.6
million. The fee is determined according to a percentage of advertising revenues. This
percentage, which is subject to yearly negotiation, was for many years, in the case of BMI,
set at 1.09% of net receipts from sponsors after certain deductions. CBS' combined costs
for ASCAP and BMI music run at about $1,000 per program. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp.
737,743 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"Id. at 745.
""Copyright holders" are the composers themselves, but usually they will have assigned
their licensing rights to their publisher. Id- at 761.
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his own price on his compositions.1 3 The court found support for this
distinction in two patent pooling cases which held that the licensing of an
entire pool of patents for a fee not reflecting actual use was not per se il-
legal.1 4
Having determined that the blanket license was not per se illegal, the
court was still faced with the task of deciding on the legality of the
license under the rule of reason. Here the court was again able to look to
the two patent pooling cases for guidance. These cases had held that the
bulk licensing of patents was legal so long as there was no overreaching
on the part of the licensor and the arrangement was freely agreed to by
the licensee. 15 In view of its finding as to lack of compulsion, the court in
CBS v. ASCAP ruled that the blanket license was "reasonable" under
the standard of the two patent pooling cases."
On appeal, the price fixing claim became the major issue in the case.
The Second Circuit sustained the lower court on the dismissal of the tie-in
claim,1 7 but reversed on the dismissal of the price fixing claim. 8 The fact
that the blanket license set a price on the collectivity of compositions
rather than on any individual composition as in the usual price fixing
case did not sway the Second Circuit because, in its view, the governing
consideration was that the blanket license "dulled" the incentive of
copyright owners to compete." The very availability of a blanket license,
the court reasoned, would permit the individual copyright owner to
choose it as his medium of licensing in preference to individual bargain-
ing."° Another way in which a blanket license overhanging the market
might reduce competition is by serving as a reference point for the set-
ting of a price in direct negotiations, because the copyright owner would
tend to set his price at a level comparable to what he had been receiving
under the blanket license. The court mentioned this second rationale, but
did not rely upon it in the absence of proof that copyright owners would
in fact behave in such a way in a direct licensing market dominated by a
blanket license.2 1
In view of its adverse effect on price competition, the Second Circuit
concluded that the blanket license would be per se illegal under the price
fixing rule unless the analogy to bulk licensing of patents was controlling
1IcL at 748.
4The two cases were Automatic Radio Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950) and Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Both in-
volved electronics manufacturing companies which needed patents held by Hazeltine. The
latter licensed the use of any and all of its patents in return for a percentage of the
licensee's sales.
5395 U.S. at 138; 339 U.S. at 834.
1400 F. Supp. at 749. The court reasoned that CBS was not compelled to take a blanket
license because it had the alternative of an ASCAP "per program" license as well as the
direct licensing option.
'"CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 134-5 (2d Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 135-40.
11Id at 139.
Uid. at 140, n. 27.
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here. The court did not, however, draw the analogy as those cases in-
volved a single seller setting a price on a pool of patents owned by it,
whereas CBS involved many sellers or licensors agreeing among
themselves as to the price at which to license a repertory formed by pool-
ing their individually held copyrights. 22 The fact that CBS was not com--
pelled to take the blanket license did not alter the court's identification of
the blanket license as a price fixing mechanism because compulsion is not
an element of price fixing.
2 3
Characterization of the blanket license as price fixing should have end-
ed the court's inquiry under settled conceptions of a per se rule. Instead,
however, the court stated that,
[I]t may be that in some circumstances market requirements
would require the acceptance of some form of price fixing. In
fact, both the plaintiff here, CBS, and the Department of
Justice, which is charged with enforcing the Sherman Act,
recognize in the case of ASCAP blanket licenses what CBS has
termed the "Per Se Rule with a Market-Functioning Excep-
tion". In short this concept holds that price-fixing is per se il-
legal except where it is absolutely necessary for the market to
function at all.24
After discussing the 1967 amicus brief in which the government pro-
posed a "market necessity" exception for the blanket license,25 the court
stated that,
[t]his "market necessity" concept, as a very limited and nar-
row exception to the per se rule against price-fixing, is not
without merit. It would seem reasonable to conclude that Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits combinations in
restraint of trade, should be construed so as not to prohibit the
II at 138.
2"The court suggests that the district court considered compulsion an element of price
fixing. I& This misrepresents the district court, as it only considered complusion in con-
nection with its rule of reason inquiry after finding that the blanket license did not con-
stitute "price fixing." 400 F. Supp. at 748-49.
11562 F. 2d at 136.
"The case in which the government suggested a market necessity justification for the
blanket license was K-91, supra note 6. The relevant portion of the government's amicus
brief is quoted in CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 137.
The K-91 case involved a radio station's challenge to ASCAP's blanket license. The court
sustained the blanket licensing of performance rights in the radio station context, but not
on a "market necessity" rationale. The K-91 court thought that ASCAP's blanket license
was "disinfected" by the government consent decree regulating ASCAP's licensing prac-
tices. See note 9, supra. Additionally, it gave weight to the fact that ASCAP's licensing
right was non exclusive and that ASCAP was not the "price fixing authority" since, under
the terms of the consent decree, the federal district court for the southern district of New
York had the power to set the price on the blanket license in the event the parties were
unable to reach agreement on a reasonable price.
In its earlier opinion on ASCAP's motion for summary judgment, the district court
distinguished K-91 on the basis that the radio station had not proposed any alternative
means of licensing performance rights, whereas CBS had a specific proposal for a form of
"per use" licensing. CBS v. ASCAP, 337 F. Supp. 394, 398 (2d Cir. 1972).
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very trade it was intended to protect.26
In a footnote, the court then added that, "The narrowness of the excep-
tion is emphasized by the circumstance that it is difficult even to imagine
another industry where such a "market necessity" defense would be ap-
plicable. "27
It is clear, therefore, that the court thought it was carving out a very
narrow exception which would not engulf the per se rule. But the market
necessity exception can only be narrow if it involves an analysis
qualitatively different from the rule of reason--which it does not--or if
there exists some principled way of limiting it to a particular type of
case--which there may be. At the outset, the option of limiting the market
necessity defense to the music industry or to the performance rights
market or, even more narrowly, to the blanket license must be rejected as
too unprincipled. Per se rules are not applied industry by industry, but
across the board to all conduct within the per se class, without regard to
assertions of the reasonableness of the conduct within the context of a
certain industry. 28 The court, although perhaps leaning toward such a
special exemption for the music industry, did not entirely preclude ap-
plication of the market necessity defense in other industries, saying only
that it would be "difficult even to imagine" another industry where the
market necessity defense would apply.2 9
After demonstrating that the court's "market necessity" analysis is no
narrower in scope than a traditional rule of reason analysis, this article
will attempt to define the type of case in which a rule of reason inquiry
such as that undertaken by CBS is appropriate. If an area for application
of a rule of reason or market necessity analysis can be defined with suffi-
cient specificity, then the per se rule will survive, although in a narrower
area than before.
"Market Necessity" as the Rule of Reason in Disguise
In CBS v. ASCAP, the Second Circuit held that the blanket license was
not absolutely necessary for the functioning of the "market," defined
very narrowly as the market in licensing performance rights to the three
national television networks. This conclusion was based on the district
court's finding that direct licensing by the three networks would be
"feasible," in the sense that it would meet a reasonable level of efficiency.
This finding was not as difficult to make as it might appear because the
networks were already obtaining synchronization rights" through direct
26562 F.2d at 137-38.
"Id. at 138, n. 22 and see text accompanying note 29 infra
"If this were not true, a court would have to employ a rule of reason analysis whenever
confronted with a restraint which had never before been challenged in the context of a par-
ticular industry. This would be so even if the restraint clearly fell within a per se prohibi-
tion, such as a direct agreement on prices.
219Id. at 138, n. 22 and see text accompanying note 25 supra.
'"The "television synchronization right" is the right to record copyrighted music on the
soundtrack of a filmed or taped program. Such rights are required for programs which are
to be rerun. 400 F. Supp. at 759.
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negotiation. 1 The direct licensing of these rights did not impose a signifi-
cant burden on the networks because the job of obtaining these rights
was delegated to the independent "packagers" who produce most of the
network shows.3 2 The packagers themselves were able to obtain the syn-
chronization rights very easily through the services of the Harry Fox
Agency, which acted as a broker in these and other rights.3 3 There is no
apparent reason why the performance right could not be licensed just as
easily through precisely the same mechanism. In fact, since the perfor-
mance right could be obtained as part of the very same transaction
through which the "synch" right is obtained, the wasteful duplication
resulting from separate negotiation of these two rights would be
eliminated. Since this direct method of licensing would be reasonably effi-
cient, while increasing price competition among copyright holders by giv-
ing them the power to determine the license fee on their own composi-
tions, direct licensing should be preferred to a system which goes through
ASCAP. This is essentially what the court found, but it was not quite
prepared to say that the networks could no longer use ASCAP.34
The court's holding, however, does not throw as much light on the
nature of the market necessity inquiry as does its dictum that the blanket
licensing of performance rights to radio stations would be an example of
"market necessity." 35 Bearing in mind that the court states its test to be
whether the price fixing is "absolutely necessary" for the functioning of
the market, it becomes apparent that in application the necessity stand-
ard is far from absolute and is in fact much closer to a "convenience" or
"efficiency" standard. This is so because it can hardly be said that the
blanket license is "absolutely" necessary for the licensing of performance
rights to radio stations. It may be true that most radio stations do not
have independent packagers who put together shows, and therefore could
not rely on these packagers to obtain performance rights for them.36 It is
also true that many radio stations do not ordinarily plan their programs
in advance and often make their broadcast selections spontaneously, as
in response to a telephoned request. However, it is equally clear that
radio stations would not stop broadcasting if the blanket license were
struck down; they would quickly find other means of securing perfor-
mance rights.
In a direct negotiation world, they could arrange separately for each
II& at 759-60.
3Zkd. at 755.
"Id. at 759-60.3 Although the court found that the blanket license constituted price fixing and that it
was per se illegal since the market necessity exception did not apply to television network
licensing, the court left the door open for the district court to find that there was a "market
need" for the blanket license which justified its continued use by the networks. CBS v.
ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 140. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
11562 F.2d at 140, n.26.36In this respect the radio industry would differ from the television industry. See text ac-
companying note 32 supro.
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broadcast of a copyrighted selection, or, more realistically, they could
purchase a license for a certain number of broadcasts of the selection and
maintain a record of the number of times it was played so as not to sur-
pass the authorized number of broadcasts. Most probably, however, a
broker in performance rights would appear in the market.3 7 Such a broker
could furnish radio stations with a schedule of copyright owners' current
"asked" prices. The station could make its selections on the basis of the
price schedule, either accepting the indicated price or negotiating directly
with the copyright owner for a lower price. Payment would then be made
at the end of every month or every year for any music actually used, tak-
ing into account the number of broadcasts of a given selection.
Even in an ASCAP license world the blanket license is not at all
"necessary." Certain variations on a "per use" license would go far
toward narrowing the efficiency differential between this type of license
and the blanket license. CBS proposed a per use license where ASCAP
would furnish the user with a price schedule on the basis of which the
user would make its selections, paying afterwards for the music actually
used. The price schedule would be amended periodically to reflect prices
copyright holders had requested in the direct negotiation market.3 8 In
view of these manifold alternatives, some of which could be quite effi-
cient, it becomes apparent that the blanket license is hardly "absolutely
necessary" for the functioning of the market in radio performance rights.
The "very limited and narrow exception" 39 which the court thought it
was creating is really not so narrow at all.
In fact, a court employing a rule of reason analysis, though, might
come up with a different result on the matter of the reasonableness of the
blanket licensing of performance rights to radio stations. Under the rule
of reason, a court would ask whether the blanket license posed a greater
restraint on competition than necessary to license performance rights to
radio stations. If the court confined its inquiry to the least restrictive
ASCAP license, it might rule in favor of some form of per use license
31400 F. Supp. at 762. The district court found that:
ITihere is no substantial basis for concluding that the Fox Agency would not
expand its services to include television performance rights, just as it has ex-
panded in the past to meet the need of publishers for a central agency for
movie performance rights and television "synch" rights. However, even if
Fox were unwilling to take on the job of brokering performance rights, the
creation of a new agency modeled along the same lines need not be the impos-
ing project CBS makes it out to be.
Id The above passage reveals a fascinating twist in the case. Because the appeal focused
on the price-fixing issue rather than the tie-in issue which had absorbed the parties at the
district court level, the parties had to reverse their respective positions on the feasibility of
direct negotiation. Thus CBS had argued at trial that direct licensing was not feasible in
order to support its claim that it was compelled to take the blanket license. Had it known
that the case would ultimately be decided on a price-fixing theory, it would have argued
just the opposite, as it would have wanted to prove the existence of many alternative ways
of licensing performance rights which made the blanket license nonesstential.
38400 F. Supp. at 747, n.7.
11562 F.2d at 137. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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where the copyright holder had some input on the price of his own com-
positions.4 Such a per use licensing system would allow price competi-
tion among copyright holders since they would be setting their own
prices. As it would clearly be more competitive and would also serve the
function of licensing performance rights, the per use license should be
preferred to the blanket license under the rule of reason.41
If the court expanded its inquiry to include direct licensing alter-
natives, it might make a finding of feasibility similar to that of the
district court in CBS. Since a direct licensing market such as that already
described42 would be more competitive than an ASCAP-dominated
market, while satisfactorily accomplishing the licensing of performance
rights, the direct licensing alternative should be preferred to an ASCAP
license under the rule of reason.
If the rule of reason could be employed to strike down the blanket li-
censing of performance rights to radio stations, it follows that an excep-
tion to the per se rule which would sustain the blanket license as
"absolutely necessary" for the functioning of the market in radio perfor-
mance rights is hardly a narrow exception. Not only does such an excep-
tion engulf the per se rule, it may engulf the rule of reason as well.
The question of whether the L-anket license constitutes "price fixing"
has yet to be resolved. The district court thought that the blanket license
was not price fixing and that it was reasonable.The court of appeals
thought that the blanket license was price fixing, but then proceeded to
apply what amounted to a rule of reason inquiry to find that the blanket
license was unreasonable. So, despite differing views over whether or not
the blanket license constituted price fixing, both courts analyzed it under
the rule of reason, but reached different conclusions. The courts,
therefore, may have disagreed on whether to call the blanket license
"price fixing," but they were in agreement that the rule of reason should
be employed in this case. Given the courts' identical conclusion on the qp-
plicability of the rule of reason, it may be unnecessary to inquire whether
a "price-fixing" label should have been attached to the blanket license.
The question is not so much whether the blanket license was "price fix-
ing" (since the term seems to be used loosely by the Second Circuit), but
whether a straight per se rule should be applied. It is true that the
blanket license has the effect of reducing price competition among
copyright holders, but, as demonstrated below, not every arrangement
which affects price competition should fall within the per se price-fixing
"
0See note 36 and accompanying text supra.41The question of what weight a court should accord to considerations of efficiency is a
delicate one in antitrust law. Some commentators and courts take the view that competi-
tion is the only concern of an antitrust court. If this were true, however, it would be dif-
ficult to explain why courts have accorded more lenient treatment to "close-knit" combina-
tions such as mergers than to "loose-knit" combinations such as cartels. The obvious ex-
planation is that mergers result in an efficiency-producing integration of productive or
distributive facilities whereas cartels do not. See notes 48-49 infra.
42See text accompanying note 36-37 supra.
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rule.43 Certain arrangements should be analyzed under the rule of reason
if they are ancillary to a joint undertaking which is able to produce a pro-
duct that none of the parties, acting alone, would have been able to pro-
duce.
Limiting the Incursion of the Market Necessity Exception
into Per Se Territory
It should now be apparent that the market necessity exception is at
least as broad as, if not broader than, the rule of reason. If so, the court
has scrapped the per se rule in favor of a rule of reason evaluation of the
blanket license. Unless there is a principled rationale for discarding the
per se rule in this type of case, the court's assault on the per se rule would
appear to be completely unjustified. It will be argued, however, that
there is such a rationale for applying the rule of reason in CBS-type cases,
although the factors making CBS such a case were not articulated by the
court.
Although the following analysis of the proper scope for per se rules is
intended to apply to all per se rules, the price-fixing rule will be used by
way of example. There are at least five different types of cases where the
question of the applicability of the per se rule against price fixing may
arise, each of which will now be described in turn.
(1) Agreements or combinations where intent to fix prices is clear. If
there is a written agreement, the price-fixing purpose will appear on the
face of the agreement, such as in a price-fixing clause. If there is a com-
bination, something may readily reveal the purpose, such as calling a
committee the "Tank Car Stabilization Committee. ' ' 44 These so-called
"direct agreements" on pricing are rarely found nowadays since firms
foolhardy enough to attempt to fix prices in spite of the well known per se
prohibition of such agreements will employ far subtler techniques.
(2) Agreements or combinations where intent is unclear but where there
is an adverse effect on price competition. In such cases, the law will
presume price-fixing intent on the theory adopted from tort law that peo-
'
3The argument made in this comment is that restraints ancillary to a lawful and useful
main purpose should not be subjected to per se scrutiny, but there is a recent case ruling
that some arrangements having an effect on price do not fall within the per se rule even
though the main purpose was illegal. Thus in Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F.
Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975), aff'd 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976). cert. denied 430 U.S. 915
(1977). the court held that a cooperative deceptive advertising campaign engaged in by five
manufacturers did not constitute price fixing even though a stimulation of demand and
consequent effect on price levels could reasonably have been anticipated from their joint
activity.
"United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 178, 190 (1940). In this seminal
price fixing case, major oil companies embarked upon a plan to "stabilize" the price of
gasoline by buying up "distress gasoline" sent to market by independent refiners. This
case is widely cited for the proposition that any tampering with the free determination of
prices by market forces is price fixing. The holding in that case, however, was facilitated
by the fact that the major oil companies had a clear intent to raise the price of gasoline
through a buying program devised and coordinated by the "Tank Car Stabilization Com-
mittee."
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ple are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their actions.4 5
These first two categories constitute the "naked restraints" which
serve no apparent purpose but the suppression of competition.46 There is
little doubt that the per se rule should apply in such cases.
(3) Agreements or combinations where the intent is to accomplish some
lawful (but not useful) objective and any effect on price competition is on-
ly incidental. The application of the per se rule in these cases is somewhat
problematic since the parties never intended to fix prices; but, if the
restraint serves no economically useful purpose, the per se rule should
probably be applied for the sake of preserving competition. 47
(4) Restraints ancillary to, and in furtherance of, an integration of com-
petitors which results in productive or distributive efficiencies benefiting
the consumer. There is disagreement among commentators as to whether
such restraints should be permitted if they result in a net reduction of
competition. Some commentators view competition as an end in itself
under the Sherman Act and therefore believe that any restraints which,
on balance, reduce competition should be outlawed regardless of possible
efficiencies. 48 Others see competition as but a means to the ultimate end
of the Sherman Act--consumer want satisfaction--and accordingly believe
that efficiency should always be taken into account by a court.49
(5) Restraints ancillary to, and in furtherance of, a joint undertaking
among competitors which is able to produce a product or service which
45See, e.g., Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960). In
that case the Plymouth Dealers of northern California distributed a price list for use in
making pricing decisions. Although customers invariably bargained over the price anyway
and there was evidence that the list was prepared and distributed in response to customer
complaints about dealer pricing practices, the court found, "lilt was an agreed starting
point; it had been agreed upon between competitors; it was in some instances in the record
respected and followed; it had to do with, and had its effect upon, price." Id. at 132. The
dealers' intent was ambiguous, so there is a possibility that they were at least in part
motivated by a desire to fix prices, but even if the dealers only intended to benefit
customers (a lawful objective), the arrangement would still be prohibited per se under the
rationale of category (3) below. But see Cook Pain note 41 supra, for the proposition that
an arrangement affecting prices raises only a rebuttable presumption of price fixing intent.
In that case, the inference of a price-fixing intent was rebutted by clear evidence that the
purpose of the arrangement was to advertise (falsely) the properties of polyurethane. See
generally Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. R v. 1165, 1173
(1964).
"United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) and see note 1 and accom-
panying text, supra.
7But see United Statees v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(restraint ancillary to a lawful main purpose does not constitute price fixing).
"See, e.g., Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 137
(1962). See note 41 supra.
'"See, e.g., R.H. BORK. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). Bork believes that the doctrine of
ancillary restraints is the best juridical vehicle for his economic views. His thesis is that
horizontal market-division or price-fixing agreement should be lawful when:
(1) the agreement accompanies a contract integration (the coordination of
other productive or distributive efforts of the parties);
(2) the agreement is ancillary to the contract integration (capable of increas-
ing the integration's efficiency and no broader than required for that
purpose);
(3) the aggregate market share of the parties does not make restriction of out-
put a realistic threat; and
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none of the parties, acting alone, could produce.50 This class of case dif-
fers from the preceding category in that there is more than an efficiency
justification for the arrangement. At stake is whether a certain product
or service is to be produced at all. Even adherents to the competition-as-
an-end model of antitrust law might agree that a combination which is
necessary to produce a product should be permitted, as well as any in-
cidental restraint which promotes the purpose of the combination.
It is believed that CBS fits into this last category of cases and that at
least three other cases which also fit into this category have recognized
that restraints which would otherwise fall within a per se rule should
nevertheless be analyzed under the rule of reason in this type of case.
These three cases will now be analyzed in some detail.
In United States v. Morgan" the government set out to prove that the
seventeen investment bank defendants had combined and conspired
against the hundreds of other firms in the investment banking industry,
through use of the syndicate system as well as other devices.52 When it
became apparent that the government's own evidence was disproving
this charge of an overall conspiracy by the seventeen defendants, the
government attempted to shift its attack to specific clauses customarily
used in syndicate agreements by the entire investment banking
industry.53 Among such clauses is one setting the public offering price of
a new issue. Judge Medina ruled that the belated attack by the govern-
ment on these price-fixing clauses was not properly before the court but
that he would, by way of dictum, express his views on the matter.5 4 He
stated that he did not consider the per se price fixing rule applicable
because the case was sui generis.55 Among the special aspects of the case
which the judge repeatedly emphasized was that the underwriting syn-
dicates formed by investment banks were necessary to raise the capital
required by businesses, for it would be difficult or impossible to find a
bank which would be prepared to assume the entire investment risk by
itself.56
If these underwriting syndicates are able, by spreading the risk, to in-
duce underwriting where it might not otherwise occur, then they serve a
useful function and should be protected by the law. Further, and of more
importance here, specific agreements made by syndicate members should
be lawful if they promote the useful function served by the syndicate
(4) the parties have not demonstrated that their primary purpose was the
restriction of output.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept; Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2),
75 YALE L.J. 373, 474 (1966).
'
0 This concept will be elaborated on later in the article.
5'118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Medina, J.)
5Id at 680.
53Syndicate agreements customarily contain clauses relating to the setting of a public of-
fering price, resale price maintenance, withholding of commissions, uniform concessions
and reallowances, and stabilization. Id. at 682.
M Id. at 686.
11Id. at 689.5 Id. at 639-40.
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itself. Thus, an agreement on the issuing price of a new security, though
literally within the scope of the price-fixing rule, should be lawful if
reasonably tailored to promote the risk-spreading function of the syn-
dicate. Since the knowledge that it will be able to sell its shares at a cer-
tain price is a crucial factor in inducing an investment bank to participate
in an underwriting, the pricing agreement is a useful and reasonable
restraint. Of course, a finding of reasonableness is not ordinarily enough
to withdraw a restraint from a per se category; if it were, nothing would
be left of the per se rule. But it is here suggested to allow a
reasonableness justification in that limited class of cases where the
restraint is incidental to a useful joint undertaking which is necessary to
serve a particular function, such as risk spreading.57
Much the same considerations can be observed at play in Mackey v.
National Football League.58 In that case the court held that a per se
analysis of the Rozelle Rule 9 was inappropriate even though it fit within
the definition of a group boycott, which is normally subject to a per se
rule.6 0 The court felt that some form of reserve system (if not the Rozelle
Rule itself) was probably necessary to maintain a competitive balance
among the teams of the League.6 1 Again, the fact that some form of
restraint might be reasonable should not, in all types of cases, justify
abandonment of the per se rule. But there are certain characteristics of
the NFL case which identify it as the type of case in which the rule of
reason should apply. Through cooperative action, represented by the for-
mation of a league, the teams are able to furnish the spectator with a pro-
duct (good sports competition) which the teams acting independently
7Judge Medina also thought that investment banks were distinguishable from the mid-
dlemen with which the courts were concerned in price fixing cases. The investment bank
does not buy and sell a product, for the item "sold"-the stock certificate-is merely tangi-
ble evidence of an underlying investment or loan relationship existing between the in-
vestor and the issuer. Furthermore, the function of the investment bank is not merely to
buy and sell as a trader or wholesaler but to furnish integrated banking services to the
issuer who is seeking expert assistance in raising capital by security issue flotation. Id. at
690.
ASCAP could also escape per se treatment under this "different type of middleman" ra-
tionale, for it offers users a product (the blanket license) different from what individual
copyright holders acting independently could offer.
58543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Another case, Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), treats the reserve
system in the hockey context in much the same way.
59The "Rozelle Rule" is an outgrowth of the NFL's "reserve system," under which every
player who signs a contract with an NFL club is bound to play for that club, and no other,
for the term of the contract plus one additional year at the option of the club. At the end of
the option year, the player becomes a "free agent." The Rozelle Rule, specifically at issue
in NFL, provides that:
[Whenever a free agent signs] a contract with a different club in the League,
then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded bet-
ween the two League clubs, the Commissioner may...award to the former club
one or more players...of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole
discretion deems fair and equitable....
543 F.2d at 611.
'OId. at 618-19.
6
'Id at 621-22.
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would be unable to furnish to the same extent. The Rozelle Rule promotes
the League's goal of providing the best spectator product by ensuring a
fair distribution of talent among the member teams. The NFL case serves
as a useful reminder that the issue of whether to apply a per se rule does
not always decide the fate of the challenged restraint. The NFL court,
having rejected a per se analysis, found that the Rozelle Rule was more
restrictive than the rule of reason, although it believed that some form of
reserve system was probably necessary to maintain a competitive
balance.
In Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc.,62 the
court was confronted with a clause in BankAmericard's by-laws which
forbade any card-issuing banks in Ban kAmericard's national credit card
system from becoming card-issuing members of the rival Mastercharge
network.6 3 The court, focusing more on whether or not this was an ap-
propriate case for per se treatment rather than on whether the clause
might literally fall within the "group boycott" label, rejected a per se
analysis because the clause was a reasonable measure to preserve the in-
tegrity of the BankAmericard system.6 4 This case also meets the criteria
for a rule of reason analysis of any incidental restraint because, as ex-
plicitly recognized by the court, a national credit card system can only ex-
ist through cooperative activity on the part of a number of banks, and the
clause prohibiting dual membership is apparently designed to preserve
the integrity of this useful cooperative endeavor.
6 5
Returning to the ASCAP case, it can be seen to possess many of the
same characteristics as the other three cases. An organization like
ASCAP is able to offer the music user a product--the blanket license-
which no individual copyright holder could offer. CBS differs from the
other cases in that the alleged restraint (the blanket license) may be an
end in itself, rather than a means to another end. The court, treating the
purpose of ASCAP as the licensing of performance rights, analyzed the
blanket license as one of several means to that end. Alternatively,
however, the blanket license could be treated as an end in itself, in which
case its legality would rest upon whether it was a sufficiently distinct
product or whether it fulfilled a particular need of the music user. The
court did not entirely neglect such an "end" analysis of the blanket
license. In its instructions to the district court on factors to consider on
remand for determination of an appropriate remedy, the court suggested
that the district court investigate the "market need" for a blanket
license.6 6 If there turned out to be such a need for the blanket license, the
court did not think the blanket license should be struck down, even
though it was not the least restrictive license under a pure "means"
analysis.
62485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973).
6 3 d. at 122.
"Id. at 127. The court also felt that a type of restraint never before challenged in the
courts should not receive cursory per se treatment. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
"Id. at 127, 128 n.7.
"CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d at 140. See note 32 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The novel "market necessity" exception to the per se price-fixing rule
proposed by CBS v. ASCAP is not the very narrow exception which the
court thought it was creating. In fact, the blanket licensing of perfor-
mance rights to radio stations, cited by the court as an example of
"market necessity," might be struck down under a conventional rule of
reason analysis. If this new exception is to stand any chance of survival,
then, it must be limited to a particular kind of case. Recognizing that the
market necessity exception to the per se rule can alternatively be viewed
as a rule of reason analysis, the problem becomes to define those types of
cases where a rule of reason inquiry is appropriate despite the literal ap-
plicability of a per se rule. This comment has suggested that such a class
of cases can be identified, and that it comprises those cases where there is
joint activity which is able to produce a product which no firm act-
ing alone could produce. Any restraints in such cases, if apparently
designed to promote such useful joint activity, should be analyzed under
the rule of reason even if they would normally fall within a per se
category.
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